Effects of the Million Hearts Model on Myocardial Infarctions, Strokes, and Medicare Spending: A Randomized Clinical Trial.

Importance: The Million Hearts Model paid health care organizations to assess and reduce cardiovascular disease (CVD) risk. Model effects on long-term outcomes are unknown. Objective: To estimate model effects on first-time myocardial infarctions (MIs) and strokes and Medicare spending over a period up to 5 years. Design, Setting, and Participants: This pragmatic cluster-randomized trial ran from 2017 to 2021, with organizations assigned to a model intervention group or standard care control group. Randomized organizations included 516 US-based primary care and specialty practices, health centers, and hospital-based outpatient clinics participating voluntarily. Of these organizations, 342 entered patients into the study population, which included Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries aged 40 to 79 years with no previous MI or stroke and with high or medium CVD risk (a 10-year predicted probability of MI or stroke [ie, CVD risk score] ≥15%) in 2017-2018. Intervention: Organizations agreed to perform guideline-concordant care, including routine CVD risk assessment and cardiovascular care management for high-risk patients. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services paid organizations to calculate CVD risk scores for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. CMS further rewarded organizations for reducing risk among high-risk beneficiaries (CVD risk score ≥30%). Main Outcomes and Measures: Outcomes included first-time CVD events (MIs, strokes, and transient ischemic attacks) identified in Medicare claims, combined first-time CVD events from claims and CVD deaths (coronary heart disease or cerebrovascular disease deaths) identified using the National Death Index, and Medicare Parts A and B spending for CVD events and overall. Outcomes were measured through 2021. Results: High- and medium-risk model intervention beneficiaries (n = 130 578) and standard care control beneficiaries (n = 88 286) were similar in age (median age, 72-73 y), sex (58%-59% men), race (7%-8% Black), and baseline CVD risk score (median, 24%). The probability of a first-time CVD event within 5 years was 0.3 percentage points lower for intervention beneficiaries than control beneficiaries (3.3% relative effect; adjusted hazard ratio [HR], 0.97 [90% CI, 0.93-1.00]; P = .09). The 5-year probability of combined first-time CVD events and CVD deaths was 0.4 percentage points lower in the intervention group (4.2% relative effect; HR, 0.96 [90% CI, 0.93-0.99]; P = .02). Medicare spending for CVD events was similar between the groups (effect estimate, -$1.83 per beneficiary per month [90% CI, -$3.97 to -$0.30]; P = .16), as was overall Medicare spending including model payments (effect estimate, $2.11 per beneficiary per month [90% CI, -$16.66 to $20.89]; P = .85). Conclusions and Relevance: The Million Hearts Model, which encouraged and paid for CVD risk assessment and reduction, reduced first-time MIs and strokes. Results support guidelines to use risk scores for CVD primary prevention. Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT04047147.

Prescription Drug Spending in Fee-for-Service Medicare, 2008-2019.

Importance: Prescription drug spending is a topic of increased interest to the public and policymakers. However, prior assessments have been limited by focusing on retail spending (Part D-covered drugs), omitting clinician-administered (Part B-covered) drug spending, or focusing on all fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries, regardless of their enrollment into prescription drug coverage. Objective: To estimate the proportion of health care spending contributed by prescription drugs and to assess spending for retail and clinician-administered prescriptions. Design, Setting, and Participants: Descriptive, serial, cross-sectional analysis of a 20% random sample of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries in the United States from 2008 to 2019 who were continuously enrolled in Parts A (hospital), B (medical), and D (prescription drug) benefits, and not in Medicare Advantage. Exposure: Calendar year. Main Outcomes and Measures: Net spending on retail (Part D-covered) and clinician-administered (Part B-covered) prescription drugs; prescription drug spending (spending on Part B-covered and Part D-covered drugs) as a percentage of total per-capita health care spending. Measures were adjusted for inflation and for postsale rebates (for Part D-covered drugs). Results: There were 3 201 284 beneficiaries enrolled in Parts A, B, and D in 2008 and 4 502 718 in 2019. In 2019, beneficiaries had a mean (SD) age of 71.7 (12.0) years, documented sex was female for 57.7%, and 69.5% had no low-income subsidies. Total per-capita spending was $16 345 in 2008 and $20 117 in 2019. Comparing 2008 with 2019, per-capita Part A spending was $7106 (95% CI, $7084-$7128) vs $7120 (95% CI, $7098-$7141), Part B drug spending was $720 (95% CI, $713-$728) vs $1641 (95% CI, $1629-$1653), Part B nondrug spending was $5113 (95% CI, $5105-$5122) vs $6702 (95% CI, $6692-$6712), and Part D net spending was $3122 (95% CI, $3117-$3127) vs $3477 (95% CI, $3466-$3489). The proportion of total annual spending attributed to prescription drugs increased from 24.0% in 2008 to 27.2% in 2019, net of estimated rebates and discounts. Conclusions and Relevance: In 2019, spending on prescription drugs represented approximately 27% of total spending among fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Part D, even after accounting for postsale rebates.

AMCP Pay-for-Performance Principles: Performance-Based Reimbursement and Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR) Fees.

DISCLOSURE: At the direction of its Board of Directors, the AMCP Public Policy and Professional Practice committees developed these principles for pay-for-performance to promote the use of these arrangements that lead to improved patient outcomes. This document was first released on the AMCP website on December 14, 2021.

Alternative Payment Models and Associations With Stroke Outcomes, Spending, and Service Utilization: A Systematic Review.

Stroke contributes an estimated $28 billion to US health care costs annually, and alternative payment models aim to improve outcomes and lower spending over fee-for-service by aligning economic incentives with high value care. This systematic review evaluates historical and current evidence regarding the impacts of alternative payment models on stroke outcomes, spending, and utilization. Included studies evaluated alternative payment models in 4 categories: pay-for-performance (n=3), prospective payments (n=14), shared savings (n=5), and capitated payments (n=14). Pay-for-performance models were not consistently associated with improvements in clinical quality indicators of stroke prevention. Studies of prospective payments suggested that poststroke spending was shifted between care settings without consistent reductions in total spending. Shared savings programs, such as US Medicare accountable care organizations and bundled payments, were generally associated with null or decreased spending and service utilization and with no differences in clinical outcomes following stroke hospitalizations. Capitated payment models were associated with inconsistent effects on poststroke spending and utilization and some worsened clinical outcomes. Shared savings models that incentivize coordination of care across care settings show potential for lowering spending with no evidence for worsened clinical outcomes; however, few studies evaluated clinical or patient-reported outcomes, and the evidence, largely US-based, may not generalize to other settings.

Patient selection in the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement model.

OBJECTIVE: To understand whether the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) program induces participating hospitals to (1) preferentially select lower risk patients, (2) reduce 90-day episode-of-care costs, (3) improve quality of care, and (4) achieve greater cost reduction during its second year, when downside financial risk was applied. DATA SOURCES: We identified beneficiaries of age 65 years or older undergoing hip or knee joint replacement in the 100% sample of Medicare fee-for-service inpatient (Part A) claims from January 1, 2013 to August 31, 2017. Cases were linked to subsequent outpatient, Part B, home health agency, and skilled nursing facility claims, as well as publicly available participation status for CJR. STUDY DESIGN: We estimated the effect of CJR for hospitals in the 67 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) selected to participate in CJR (785 hospitals), compared to those in 104 non-CJR MSAs (962 hospitals; maintaining fee-for-service). A difference-in-differences approach was used to detect patient selection, as well as to compare 90-day episode-of-care costs and quality of care between CJR and non-CJR hospitals over the first two performance years. DATA COLLECTION: We excluded 172 hospitals from our analysis due to their preexisting BPCI participation. We focused on elective admissions in the main analysis. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: While reductions in 90-day episode-of-care costs were greater among CJR hospitals (-$902, 95% CI: -$1305, -$499), largely driven by a 16.8% (p < 0.01) decline in 90-day spending in skilled nursing facilities, CJR hospitals significantly reduced the 90-day readmission rate (-3.9%; p < 0.05) and preferentially avoided patients aged 85 years or older (-5.9%; p < 0.01) and Black (-7.0%; p < 0.01). Cost reduction was greater in 2017 than in 2016, corresponding to the start of downside risk. CONCLUSIONS: Participation in CJR was associated with a modest cost reduction and a reduction in 90-day readmission rates; however, we also observed evidence of preferential avoidance of older patients perceived as being higher risk among CJR hospitals.

How Did Orthopaedic Surgeons Perform in the 2018 Centers for Medicaid & Medicare Services Merit-based Incentive Payment System?

BACKGROUND: The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is the latest value-based payment program implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. As performance-based bonuses and penalties continue to rise in magnitude, it is essential to evaluate this program's ability to achieve its core objectives of quality improvement, cost reduction, and competition around clinically meaningful outcomes. QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: We asked the following: (1) How do orthopaedic surgeons differ on the MIPS compared with surgeons in other specialties, both in terms of the MIPS scores and bonuses that derive from them? (2) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving penalties based on the MIPS? (3) What features of surgeons and practices are associated with receiving a perfect score of 100 based on the MIPS? METHODS: Scores from the 2018 MIPS reporting period were linked to physician demographic and practice-based information using the Medicare Part B Provider Utilization and Payment File, the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System Data (NPPES), and National Physician Compare Database. For all orthopaedic surgeons identified within the Physician Compare Database, there were 15,210 MIPS scores identified, representing a 72% (15,210 of 21,124) participation rate in the 2018 MIPS. Those participating in the MIPS receive a final score (0 to 100, with 100 being a perfect score) based on a weighted calculation of performance metrics across four domains: quality, promoting interoperability, improvement activities, and costs. In 2018, orthopaedic surgeons had an overall mean ± SD score of 87 ± 21. From these scores, payment adjustments are determined in the following manner: scores less than 15 received a maximum penalty adjustment of -5% ("penalty"), scores equal to 15 did not receive an adjustment ("neutral"), scores between 15 and 70 received a positive adjustment ("positive"), and scores above 70 (maximum 100) received both a positive adjustment and an additional exceptional performance adjustment with a maximum adjustment of +5% ("bonus"). Adjustments among orthopaedic surgeons were compared across various demographic and practice characteristics. Both the mean MIPS score and the resulting payment adjustments were compared with a group of surgeons in other subspecialties. Finally, multivariable logistic regression models were generated to identify which variables were associated with increased odds of receiving a penalty as well as a perfect score of 100. RESULTS: Compared with surgeons in other specialties, orthopaedic surgeons' mean MIPS score was 4.8 (95% CI 4.3 to 5.2; p < 0.001) points lower. From this difference, a lower proportion of orthopaedic surgeons received bonuses (-5.0% [95% CI -5.6 to -4.3]; p < 0.001), and a greater proportion received penalties (+0.5% [95% CI 0.2 to 0.8]; p < 0.001) and positive adjustments (+4.6% [95% CI 6.1 to 10.7]; p < 0.001) compared with surgeons in other specialties. After controlling for potentially confounding variables such as gender, years in practice, and practice setting, small (1 to 49 members) group size (adjusted odds ratio 22.2 [95% CI 8.17 to 60.3]; p < 0.001) and higher Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) scores (aOR 2.32 [95% CI 1.35 to 4.01]; p = 0.002) were associated with increased odds of a penalty. Also, after controlling for potential confounding, we found that reporting through an alternative payment model (aOR 28.7 [95% CI 24.0 to 34.3]; p < 0.001) was associated with increased odds of a perfect score, whereas small practice size (1 to 49 members) (aOR 0.35 [95% CI 0.31 to 0.39]; p < 0.001), a high patient volume (greater than 500 Medicare patients) (aOR 0.82 [95% CI 0.70 to 0.95]; p = 0.01), and higher HCC score (aOR 0.79 [95% Cl 0.66 to 0.93]; p = 0.006) were associated with decreased odds of a perfect MIPS score. CONCLUSION: Collectively, orthopaedic surgeons performed well in the second year of the MIPS, with 87% earning bonus payments. Among participating orthopaedic surgeons, individual reporting affiliation, small practice size, and more medically complex patient populations were associated with higher odds of receiving penalties and lower odds of earning a perfect score. Based on these findings, we recommend that individuals and orthopaedic surgeons in small group practices strive to forge partnerships with larger hospital practices with adequate ancillary staff to support quality reporting initiatives. Such partnerships may help relieve surgeons of growing administrative obligations and allow for maintained focus on direct patient care activities. Policymakers should aim to produce a shortened panel of performance measures to ensure more standardized comparison and less time and energy diverted from established clinical workflows. The current MIPS scoring methodology should also be amended with a complexity modifier to ensure fair evaluation of surgeons practicing in the safety net setting, or those treating patients with a high comorbidity burden. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level III, therapeutic study.

Reimbursement for Female-Specific Compared With Male-Specific Procedures Over Time.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate whether per-procedure work relative value units (RVUs) have changed over time and to compare time-based compensation for female-specific procedures compared with male-specific procedures. METHODS: Using the National Surgical Quality Improvement Program files for 2015-2018, we compared operative time and RVUs for 12 pairs of sex-specific procedures. Procedures were matched to be anatomically and technically similar. Procedure-assigned RVUs in 2015 were compared with 1997. Procedure compensation was determined using median dollars per RVU provided in SullivanCotter's 2018 Physician Compensation and Productivity Survey. This was compared with specialty-specific McGraw-Hill per-RVU data from 1994. Statistical analysis was performed with chi-square and Kruskal-Wallis tests. RESULTS: A total of 12,120 patients underwent 6,217 male-specific procedures and 5,903 female-specific procedures. Male-specific procedures had a median (interquartile range) RVU of 25.2 (21.4-25.2), compared with 7.5 (7.5-23.4) for female-specific procedures (P<.001). Male-specific procedures were 79 minutes longer (median [interquartile range] 136 minutes [98-186] vs 57 minutes [25-125], P<.001). Female-specific procedures were reimbursed at a higher hourly rate (10.6 RVU/hour [7.2-16.2] vs 9.7 RVU/hour [7.4-12.8], P<.001). However, male-specific procedures were better reimbursed ($599/h [$457-790] vs $555/h [$377-843], P<.001). Overall, per-procedure RVUs for male-specific surgeries have increased 13%, whereas, for female-specific surgeries, per-procedure RVUs have increased 26%. Reimbursement per RVU for male-specific procedures has decreased 8% ($67.30 to $61.65), whereas for female-specific procedures it has increased 14% ($44.50 to $52.02). CONCLUSION: Increases in RVUs and specialty-specific compensation have resulted in more equitable reimbursement for female-specific procedures. However, even with these changes, there is a lower relative value of work, driven by specialty-specific compensation rates, for procedures performed for women-only compared with equivalent men-only procedures.

Gender-based differences in physician payments within the fee-for-service system in Ontario: a retrospective, cross-sectional study.

BACKGROUND: Differences in physician income by gender have been described in numerous jurisdictions, but few studies have looked at a Canadian cohort with adjustment for confounders. In this study, we aimed to understand differences in fee-for-service payments to men and women physicians in Ontario. METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional analysis of all Ontario physicians who submitted claims to the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) in 2017. For each physician, we gathered demographic information from the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario registry. We compared differences in physician claims between men and women in the entire cohort and within each specialty using multivariable linear regressions, controlling for length of practice, specialty and practice location. RESULTS: We identified a cohort of 30 167 physicians who submitted claims to OHIP in 2017, including 17 992 men and 12 175 women. When controlling for confounding variables in a linear mixed-effects regression model, annual physician claims were $93 930 (95% confidence interval $88 434 to $99 431) higher for men than for women. Women claimed 74% as much as men when adjusting for covariates. This discrepancy was present in nearly all specialty categories. Men claimed more than women throughout their careers, with the greatest gap 10-15 years into practice. INTERPRETATION: We found a gender gap in fee-for-service claims in Ontario, with women claiming less than men overall and in nearly every specialty. Further work is required to understand the root causes of the gender pay gap.

[Episode-based bundled payment model: evaluation of medical costs for early operable breast cancer]. / Financement à l'épisode de soins : évaluation du coût d'une chirurgie première pour cancer du sein précoce.

INTRODUCTION: Episode-based bundled payment model is actually opposing to fee-for-service model, intending to incentivize coordinated care. The aims of these study were to determine episode-based costs for surgery in early breast cancer patients and to propose a payment model. METHODS: OPTISOINS01 was a multicenter prospective study including early breast cancer patients from diagnosis to one-year follow up. Direct medical costs, quality and patient reported outcomes were collected. RESULTS: Data from 604 patients were analyzed. Episode-based costs for surgery were higher in case of: planned radical surgery (OR=9,47 ; IC95 % [3,49-28,01]; P<0,001), hospitalization during more than one night (OR=6,73; IC95% [2,59-17,46]; P<0,001), home hospitalization (OR=11,07 ; IC95 % [3,01-173][3,01-54][3,01-543][3,01-54,33]; P<0,001) and re-hospitalization (OR=25,71 ; IC95 % [9,24-89,17; P<0,001). The average cost was 5 268 € [2 947-18 461] when a lumpectomy was planned and 7408 € [4 222-22 565] in case of radical mastectomy. Bootstrap method was applied for internal validation of the cost model showing the reliability of the model with an area under the curve of 0,83 (95 % CI [0,80-0,86]). Care quality and patient reported outcomes were not related to the costs. DISCUSSION: This is the first report of episode-based costs for breast cancer surgery. An external validation will be necessary to validate our payment model.

Sepsis Among Medicare Beneficiaries: 4. Precoronavirus Disease 2019 Update January 2012-February 2020.

OBJECTIVES: To provide updated information on the burdens of sepsis during acute inpatient admissions for Medicare beneficiaries. DESIGN: Analysis of paid Medicare claims via the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services DataLink Project. SETTING: All U.S. acute-care hospitals, excluding federally operated hospitals (Veterans Administration and Defense Health Agency). PATIENTS: All Medicare beneficiaries, January 2012-February 2020, with an explicit sepsis diagnostic code assigned during an inpatient admission. INTERVENTIONS: None. MEASUREMENTS AND MAIN RESULTS: The count of Medicare Part A/B (fee-for-service) plus Medicare Advantage inpatient sepsis admissions rose from 981,027 (CY2012) to 1,700,433 (CY 2019). The proportion of total admissions with sepsis in the Medicare Advantage population rose from 21.43% to 35.39%, reflecting the increasing beneficiary proportion enrolled in Medicare Advantage. In CY2019, 6-month mortality rates in Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries for sepsis continued to decline, but remained high: 59.9% for septic shock, 35.5% for severe sepsis, 30.8% for sepsis attributed to a specific organism, and 26.5% for unspecified sepsis. Total fee-for-service-only inpatient hospital costs rose from $17.79B (CY2012) to $22.98B (CY2019). We estimated that the aggregate cost of sepsis hospital care for the entire U.S. population was at least $57.47B in 2019. Inclusion of 14 months' (January 2019-February 2020) newer data exposed new trends: the cost per patient, number of admissions, and fraction of patients with sepsis labeled as present on admission inflected around November 2015, coincident with the change to International Classification of Diseases, 10th Edition, and introduction of the Severe Sepsis and Septic Shock Management Bundle (SEP-1) metric. CONCLUSIONS: Sepsis among Medicare beneficiaries precoronavirus disease 2019 imposed immense burdens upon patients, their families, and the taxpayers.

Carving Out Financial Success: The Power of Insurance Carve-Outs in a Private Plastic Surgery Practice.

BACKGROUND: Since the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was signed into law, there has been a push away from fee-for-service payment models. The rise of bundled payments has drastically impacted plastic surgeons' incomes, especially nonsalaried surgeons in private practice. As a result, physicians must now attempt to optimize contractual reimbursement agreements (carve-outs) with insurance providers. The aim of this article is to explain the economics behind negotiating carve-outs and to offer a how-to guide for plastic surgeons to use in such negotiations. METHODS: Based on work relative value units, Medicare reimbursement, overhead expenses, physician workload, and desired income, the authors present an approach that allows surgeons to evaluate the reimbursement they receive for various procedures. The authors then review factors that influence whether a carve-out can be pursued. Finally, the authors consider relevant nuances of negotiating with insurance companies. RESULTS: Using tissue expander insertion (CPT 19357) as an example, the authors review the mathematics, thought process required, and necessary steps in determining whether a carve-out should be pursued. Strategies for negotiation with insurance companies were identified. The presented approach can be used to potentially negotiate a carve-out for any reconstructive procedure that meets appropriate financial criteria. CONCLUSIONS: Understanding practice costs will allow plastic surgeons to evaluate the true value of insurance reimbursements and determine whether a carve-out is worth pursuing. Plastic surgeons must be prepared to negotiate adequate reimbursement carve-outs whenever possible. Ultimately, by aligning the best quality patient care with insurance companies' financial motivations, plastic surgeons have the opportunity to improve reimbursement for some reconstructive procedures.

Improving target price calculations in Medicare bundled payment programs.

OBJECTIVE: To compare the predictive accuracy of two approaches to target price calculations under Bundled Payments for Care Improvement-Advanced (BPCI-A): the traditional Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) methodology and an empirical Bayes approach designed to mitigate the effects of regression to the mean. DATA SOURCES: Medicare fee-for-service claims for beneficiaries discharged from acute care hospitals between 2010 and 2016. STUDY DESIGN: We used data from a baseline period (discharges between January 1, 2010 and September 30, 2013) to predict spending in a performance period (discharges between October 1, 2015 and June 30, 2016). For 23 clinical episode types in BPCI-A, we compared the average prediction error across hospitals associated with each statistical approach. We also calculated an average across all clinical episode types and explored differences by hospital size. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: We used a 20% sample of Medicare claims, excluding hospitals and episode types with small numbers of observations. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The empirical Bayes approach resulted in significantly more accurate episode spending predictions for 19 of 23 clinical episode types. Across all episode types, prediction error averaged $8456 for the CMS approach versus $7521 for the empirical Bayes approach. Greater improvements in accuracy were observed with increasing hospital size. CONCLUSIONS: CMS should consider using empirical Bayes methods to calculate target prices for BPCI-A.

Hospital at Home services: An inventory of fee-for-service payments to inform Medicare reimbursement.

BACKGROUND: Hospital at Home (HaH) is a growing model of care with proven patient benefits. However, for the types of services required to provide an episode of HaH, full Medicare reimbursement is traditionally paid only if care is provided in inpatient facilities. DESIGN: This project identifies HaH services that could be reimbursable under Medicare to inform episodic care within fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare. SETTING: All data are derived from acute services provided from the Mount Sinai HaH program between 2014 and 2017 as part of a Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) demonstration program. PARTICIPANTS: The sample was limited to patients with one of the following five admitting diagnoses: urinary tract infection (n = 70), pneumonia (n = 60), cellulitis (n = 45), heart failure (n = 37), and chronic lung disease (n = 24) for a total of 236 acute episodes. MEASUREMENTS: HaH services were inventoried from three sources: electronic medical records, Medicare billing and itemized vendor billing. For each admitting diagnosis, four reimbursement scenarios were evaluated: (1) FFS Medicare without a home health episode, (2) FFS Medicare with a home health episode, (3) two-sided risk ACO with a home health episode, and (4) two-sided risk ACO without a home health episode. RESULTS: Across diagnoses, there were 1.5-1.9 MD visits and 1.5-2.7 nursing visits per episode. The Medicare FFS model without home health care had the lowest reimbursement potential ($964-$1604) per episode. The Medicare fee-for-service within ACO models with home health care had the greatest potential for reimbursement $4519-$4718. There was limited variation in costs by diagnosis. CONCLUSION AND RELEVANCE: Though existing payment models might be used to pay for many HaH acute services, significant gaps in reimbursement remain. Extending the benefits of HaH to the Medicare beneficiaries that are likely to derive the greatest benefit will require new payment models for FFS Medicare.

Reducing administrative costs in US health care: Assessing single payer and its alternatives.

OBJECTIVE: Excess administrative costs in the US health care system are routinely referenced as a justification for comprehensive reform. While there is agreement that these costs are too high, there is little understanding of what generates administrative costs and what policy options might mitigate them. DATA SOURCES: Literature review and national utilization and expenditure data. STUDY DESIGN: We developed a simulation model of physician billing and insurance-related (BIR) costs to estimate how certain policy reforms would generate savings. Our model is based on structural elements of the payment process in the United States and considers each provider's number of health plan contracts, the number of features in each health plan, the clinical and nonclinical processes required to submit a bill for payment, and the compliance costs associated with medical billing. DATA EXTRACTION: For several types of visits, we estimated fixed and variable costs of the billing process. We used the model to estimate the BIR costs at a national level under a variety of policy scenarios, including variations of a single payer "Medicare-for-All" model that extends fee-for-service Medicare to the entire population and policy efforts to reduce administrative costs in a multi-payer model. We conducted sensitivity analyses of a wide variety of model parameters. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Our model estimates that national BIR costs are reduced between 33% and 53% in Medicare-for-All style single-payer models and between 27% and 63% in various multi-payer models. Under a wide range of assumptions and sensitivity analyses, standardizing contracts generates larger savings with less variance than savings from single-payer strategies. CONCLUSION: Although moving toward a single-payer system will reduce BIR costs, certain reforms to payer-provider contracts could generate at least as many administrative cost savings without radically reforming the entire health system. BIR costs can be meaningfully reduced without abandoning a multi-payer system.